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DEFENDING THE LOCAL MARKET AGAINST FOREIGN COMPETITORS: THE 
EXAMPLE OF CHILEAN RETAILERS 
 
Abstract 
 
South American countries have experienced the arrival of large American and European 
retailers, that attempt to occupy important position in these markets. Nonetheless, the situation 
in Chile differs from its neighbouring countries. The largest retailers in Chile are local family 
businesses, that have established themselves as legitimate organizations and are well regarded 
in the Chilean business community. Based on an analysis of the three major sectors of retailing 
in Chile, this paper describes the actions taken by Chilean retailers to defend themselves 
effectively against the attempts of foreign retailers to operate in their market, and the 
outcomes resulting from this process. By having to deal with strong local and foreign 
competition, Chilean retailers imitated the best practices of foreign competitors and learned to 
adapt their retail offer to satisfy the local customers’ needs.   
 
KEY WORDS: Chile, retailing, foreign competitors, defence strategies, retail sectors
 2
DEFENDING THE LOCAL MARKET AGAINST FOREIGN COMPETITORS: THE 
EXAMPLE OF CHILEAN RETAILERS 
Introduction 
The increase in globalisation of markets has reached the retailing industry in South 
America. During the last years, this part of the world has experienced the arrival of large 
American and European retail chains, with their international expertise and vanguard 
technology. In Argentina and Brazil, two of the largest countries in South America, these 
foreign retail chains have become important market leaders. For example, in Argentina, most 
grocery retail chains belong to foreign companies (see table 1). 
The retailing situation in Chile differs from other South American countries. Chilean 
retailers have consistently and fiercely defended their local market from foreign competitors. 
The largest companies of retail sectors such as grocery retailing, department stores, and home 
improvement, are all Chilean family businesses, that compete strongly in this small market 
(see table 2). This strong competition has hindered the internationalisation attempts of large 
multinational retailers, which have not performed well in Chile. For example, Sears, J.C. 
Penney, Royal Ahold, and Home Depot withdrew from the country after several years of huge 
losses. Furthermore, retailers such as Wal-Mart and Casino have not attempted to enter this 
market, although they have operations in neighbouring countries.  
The main objective of this paper is to analyse, in an emerging country, how domestic 
retailers adjust to compete with international retailers who enter their market. Chilean retailers 
are seen as legitimate organizations due to their knowledge of the market and customer needs. 
These firms are led by professionals that belong to large family business groups in Chile, 
which are well regarded by the Chilean business community. This paper suggests that Chilean 
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retailers have fought cleverly against foreign competitors by improving their retail offer, 
imitating the best practices of the foreign retailers (e.g., customer service), and strengthening 
their market knowledge. This formula has been successful for most of the retail industries in 
Chile and has led to greater consolidation, concentration, and professionalisation of the retail 
industry, which results in a better retail offer for consumers.  
Literature Review 
Due to increased retail internationalisation, a vast amount of literature has emerged 
examining the international activities of European, North American, and Japanese retailers 
(e.g., Tordjman, 1988; Alexander, 1995, Robinson and Clarke-Hill, 1990; Treadgold, 1991; 
Dupuis and Prime, 1996; Sternquist, 1997; Arnold and Fernie, 2000; Sparks, 1995; Clarke and 
Rimmer, 1997; Laulajainen, 1991; Wrigley, 1997; Goldman, 2001).  This research has been 
generally composed of case studies of specific retailers, such as Southland Corporation’s 
internationalisation to Japan (Sparks, 1995), or Carrefour’s success in Taiwan (Dupuis and 
Prime, 1996).  Although these studies are very valuable, they have mainly focused on 
developed markets and emerging Asian countries, and still little is known about the 
performance of multinational retailers in Latin American markets.  
Additionally, scholars argue that there is still a need for a better understanding of 
internationalisation aspects of retailers. For instance, Sparks (1995) indicated that market entry 
is one tangible outcome of the retail internationalisation process, but that there are other 
outcomes as well which require further investigation, such as performance in the foreign 
market. Bianchi and Arnold (2003) also argued that there is need to understand the effect of 
institutional elements of the foreign environment on the internationalisation process. 
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Several environmental differences are mentioned as generating costs, risks, and 
barriers for internationalising firms. Some of the most important for retailers are regulatory, 
geographical, economic, cultural, psychic and administrative differences (Davies, 1995; 
Alexander, 1997; Dupuis and Prime, 1996; O’Grady and Lane, 1997). For example, Wrigley’s 
(2003) recent case study of Royal Ahold’s experience in Latin America, shows that the 
multinational firm suffered strong challenges when seeking to transfer firm practices to 
different institutional environments.    
One aspect of the foreign environment that has been overlooked refers to the strategies 
held by local retailers against these international competitors and their effect on the 
performance of the retailers in the marketplace. For example, DaRocha and Dib (2002) 
examined the effects of Wal-Mart’s entry to Brazil, and concluded that local firms attempt to 
compete in different ways against foreign retailers from developed countries. Additionally, 
Bianchi and Arnold (2003) examined the operation of Home Depot in Chile and concluded 
that Chilean retailers were relevant social actors of the marketplace that hindered Home 
Depot’s performance in Chile. Furthermore, Goldman (2000) examined the emulation of best 
practices of foreign retailers by local incumbents.  
This sheds light on the importance of examining in more exhaustive way the strategies 
flowed by local firms against international retailers. Specifically, additional research is 
required to address the following relevant issues: (a) strategies that local retailers develop to 
defend their markets successfully, and (b) emulation of best practices being introduced into the 
emerging markets by the international retailers. Thus, the objective of this paper is to address 
these issues by examining the Chilean retail industry, which has consistently been able to 
defend itself from foreign competitors. 
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Chilean Retail Marketplace 
The retail marketplace in Chile is very competitive mainly because of Chile’s capitalist 
economic system and openness to international trade. All major international brands are 
available and prices are very competitive. The retailing industry has gone through a rapid 
expansion process, especially department stores, home improvement, and grocery retailers. 
These firms have incorporated modern technology, improving customer service through 
employee training, and provided credit cards for customers. All these advances are being 
developed especially by the larger retail companies, which have contributed to the decline of 
smaller neighbourhood stores and shops, which has resulted in major concentration and 
efficiency.  
The Republic of Chile has a population of 15.2 million habitants (INE, 2003). Similar 
to other Latin American countries, over 40% of Chile’s citizens live in the capital: Santiago. 
Although the population is not large compared to its neighbours, Chile has many 
characteristics that make it an attractive market for foreign investment. For example, Chilean 
citizens have a high literacy rate (95%), low infant mortality rate (1/1,000), and life 
expectancy of 75 yrs, which is comparable to developed countries (www.state.gov).  
According to a PricewaterhouseCoopers country report1, Chile also has a stable 
democratic government, stable economy, and it is considered one of the least corrupted 
countries in the world. Furthermore, a study by U.S.B bank2, finds that that the world’s hardest 
working population resides in Santiago, expressed by the nature of working hours per day. 
Nevertheless, the hard work of Chileans does not translate into a great spending capacity.  
                                                          
1 www.economist.com/displayStory.cfm?Story_ID=523577 
2 www.economist.com/displayStory.cfm?Story_ID=459509 
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Chile’s GDP per capita is only U.S. $ 4,600, which is less than 25% of GDP per capita in 
Canada, U.S. $21,788 (www.state.gov/).  This evidences the lack of productivity shown by the 
average worker in Chile. 
There are additional psychological characteristics, which are idiosyncratic to the 
Chilean society, in comparison to its neighbouring countries. Godoy (1985) suggests that 
Chileans are very willing to encounter challenges and work hard to improve their living 
standards. These characteristics seem to have their origin as a result of long wars against the 
natives (Araucanos) and pirates, in addition to earthquakes and seaquakes. Consistent with 
Godoy, Huneeus (1983) explains that in Chile there is a confrontation between two important 
cultural forces: the European and the native. Europeans had to fight in Chile very hard in order 
to impose their ideas. Although the occidental culture prevails, Chileans still maintain 
traditions that provide identity. 
Chile, as well as other Latin American countries, are generally considered collectivist 
cultures (Hofstede, 1980).  The collectivist unit in Latin America is the family and not the 
community or nation. The strong sense of family and the loyalty owed to family are evident in 
all aspects of social life in Latin America (Albert, 1996). The family’s boundaries are 
extended even further by the practice of co-parenting, and concern for social approval is high 
(Albert, 1996). Children live with their parents, usually until they get married. In many cases, 
because of economic difficulties, young families live with extended relatives. Chile is the only 
Latin American country that has no law of divorce.  
Grocery Retailing in Chile 
The supermarket industry is the most important distribution channel for the mass 
consumption products today in Chile, representing 55% of food and basic product total sales 
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(AC Nielsen Report, April, 2003). During 2002, the industry showed sales for US$4.300 
millions, which represented 6,6% of GDP, and a 10,1% increase compared to 2001 total sales. 
47,3% of the sales activity is concentrated in the Santiago area (National Institute of Statistics, 
www.ine.cl)  
  The three major companies of grocery retailing in Chile are the companies Distribucion 
y Servcios (D&S), Cencosud, and Santa Isabel, concentrating 48,2% of the grocery retail 
market. Almost all grocery chains are locally owned except for Carrefour. Furthermore, 
Carrefour, after four years of operation in Chile, had only reached a small portion of market 
share, and Santa Isabel was sold to Cencosud (see Table 2).  
The first supermarket in Chile opened in 1957 under the brand Almac, and belonged to 
the company D&S. Almost two decades later, in 1975, Cencosud created the first hypermarket 
Jumbo in Santiago. Since the 1980s, grocery retailing began to grow steadily in terms of sales, 
number of stores and store surface. During the last decade, new formats appeared (e.g., 
discount supermarket) and logistics and price became two strategic tools for the industry.  
In 1997, due to the potential entrance of international competitors such as Wal-Mart 
and Carrefour, both Cencosud and D&S developed an investment plan to defend their 
positions against foreign firms. Cencosud invested in new store openings in Santiago, Viña del 
Mar and Rancagua; and D&S invested US$396 millions in developing a new hypermarket 
format called LIDER, along with a new distribution centre. As predicted, in 1998 the first 
foreign actor, Carrefour, entered the Chilean market by opening a hypermarket store in 
Santiago. This was followed by Disco-Ahold International Holdings N.V., which took control 
of 65,3% of Santa Isabel. This year was also the beginning of the economic crisis in Chile and 
in the rest of Latin America.  
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During 1999 and 2000, the recession had a strong negative effect on the Chilean 
grocery retailing industry, with store sales decreasing by 2% in 1998, and keeping the growth 
rates at their minimum values in 2000. Nevertheless, locally-owned retail chains bet on new 
investment projects to overcome the future recovery that was expected to come in the short 
term. The year 2002, was a period of consolidation. Industry investment plans totalised 
US$320 millions, and the year finished with low prices and tight margins for most chains (see 
Figure 1).  
Distribucion y Servicios S.A. (D&S) 
D&S is the largest grocery chain in Chile, and is owned by the Ibañez Family. D&S 
operates three different formats in Chile, each one of them with a different brand: (a) Discount 
Hypermarket LIDER, (b)  Discount Supermarket EKONO, and (c) Supermarket ALMAC. 
Currently D&S is working in unifying its formats around the most competitive brand: LIDER.  
D&S was founded in 1893, and in 1957, Ibañez y Cia. inaugurated the first 
supermarket in Santiago under the name of Almac. During the 1980’s the company entered a 
new stage of development with the opening of their first discount supermarket Ekono in 
Santiago. In 1993, the company inaugurated the first EKONO in Argentina, but the economic 
crisis and strategic decisions led them out of this country a few years later.  
 In 1997, D&S introduced the discount hypermarket format, under the name of LIDER. 
This format was intended to compete directly against Carrefour, which had announced its 
intention to enter the country. From 1998-2001, D&S focused on opening new LIDER stores, 
and providing new service to customers, such as the Presto Card, coffee shops and drugstore 
products inside the store.  
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The year 2002 was a period of consolidation for D&S. At the end of the year, the 
company announced that it would aim for company growth, focusing on profits rather than on 
number of stores. During this year sales increased 10% compared to the previous year, 
totalling US$1.293 millions (company annual report, 2002). The consumer base increased by 
15%, reaching 123 millions per year. Net contribution was US$33,1 millions, showing a 41% 
decrease compared to 2001. Company’s market share grew by 1% reaching a 30% nationally 
and a 41,2% in Santiago. By the end of 2002, D&S had three supermarket formats, twelve 
business areas, one customer service college and one distribution centre. D&S titles are 
currently being traded in the New York, Santiago and Madrid stock exchange markets. 
Jumbo 
Jumbo belongs to the business group Cencosud S.A. This economic group also owns 
Easy S.A., Inmobiliaria Las Verbenas and Food and Fantasy Ltda.. The company Cencosud 
invests on shopping mall development, retail commercialisation and management. Jumbo 
consists in a hypermarket grocery chain, which is positioned as providing consumers high 
quality, wide assortment, and great service. Jumbo’s target market corresponds mainly to the 
middle and higher income segments, and two of Jumbo stores have the highest revenues per 
store in the whole country (El Mercurio, September 09, 2003).  
The company was founded by it’s current president and main stakeholder Mr. Horst 
Paulmann, in 1982, with the objective of providing a wide assortment of quality products and 
excellent service, all in one store. With this idea on his mind the company created Jumbo, the 
first hypermarket in Chile, with approximately 7.000 sq. mts. The internationalisation of 
Jumbo’s operations has been a great success since it’s beginning in 1982. Currently the 
company has 11 Jumbo Hypermarkets in Argentina. 
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At the end of 2002, Jumbo operated 7 hypermarkets (5 in Santiago, 1 in Viña del Mar 
and 1 in Rancagua), and sales for the year totalised US$426 millions with a 8,7% market share 
(company annual report, 2002). Cencosud recently acquired the grocery chain Santa Isabel, 
from Disco-Ahold, and became the second largest player of this industry. 
Santa Isabel 
At the end of 2002, Santa Isabel was the second supermarket in importance, with 9,7% 
of market share in Chile. However, this retail chain showed permanent losses since 1996. 
Santa Isabel is owned by Disco-Ahold International Holdings N.V, which is the result of a 
joint-venture between Koninklijke Ahold N.V., one of the biggest supermarket chains in the 
world, and Velox, an important Uruguayan financial group that, at the same time, owns 
Supermercados Disco in Argentina. Santa Isabel, besides his own brand, owns TOPS, a 
convenience supermarket chain. 
Santa Isabel was founded in Valparaiso in 1975 by Mr. Eduardo Elberg. Until 1988, 
Mr. Elberg and his family managed to transform a small self-service grocery store into 14 
supermarkets located in different regions of the country. After a public ADR offering in 1993 
the company started both it’s international expansion, acquiring two supermarket chains in 
Lima, Perú, and it’s national expansion, acquiring 25 stores from the local chain Multimarket 
and 10 stores from the local chain Marmentini, which left Santa Isabel as the biggest 
supermarket chain in Chile.  
In 1997 Velox International Investment, controller of Disco, acquired 36,96% of the 
company and a few months later, Royal Ahold acquired one half of the stocks owned by 
Velox, leading to the creation of Disco-Ahold International Holdings N.V. Under the new 
administration, Santa Isabel continued it’s expansion plan by inaugurating 10 new 
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supermarkets, one of them in Ecuador, and introducing Stock, a new format focused on price. 
By the end of 1998 Santa Isabel had 90 stores opened in South America, 63 in Chile, 19 in 
Peru, 6 in Paraguay and 2 in Ecuador. 
During 2001, the company took control over Supermercados Agas, adding 14 new 
stores in the Metropolitan Region. In June 2001, the company introduced a new hypermarket 
format in Chile denominated TOPS. By the end of 2001, another 24 supermarkets were 
renewed, ending the period with 118 operating stores, and losses of US$17,67 millions. By the 
end of the year 2002 Santa Isabel operated 76 stores in Chile and 42 in Peru and Paraguay. 
Sales for this year totalised  US$393 millions and losses correspond to US$47,3 millions 
(company annual report, 2002). 
Department Store Retailing in Chile 
During the year 2002, strong competition was seen in the department store industry in 
Chile, with three major players: Falabella, Ripley and Almacenes Paris. These three chain 
stores are basically focused on the high and middle income segments. All three companies 
provide similar products and services for customers, are involved in the real state business, 
and operate in large shopping malls. The aggressiveness of the competition has hindered 
operating margins, putting pressure in expanding nationally and internationally. For example, 
Falabella has operations in Peru and Argentina. Ripley also operates in Peru. Both Falabella 
and Almacenes Paris are public companies with their stocks being traded in the stock 
exchange market. 
There are also some middle size stores operating in this market and they represent an 
indirect competence for the three big ones. Usually this middle size stores vary between 2.500 
and 3.000 sq.mts. and focus on the middle class segment. They basically offer two kinds of 
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products: clothes (60%) and house appliances (40%). Their strategy is to operate in downtown 
areas of the most important cities outside of Santiago3, as opposed to large shopping malls. 
This is the case of companies as La Polar, Corona, Johnson’s, Tricot and Hites. 
Sears started operations in Chile during the late 1970’s, with one store located in the 
largest mall, Parque Arauco. After a couple of years of losses, Sears withdrew from Chile. The 
company realized that the marketplace was very competitive and that their retail offer did not 
suit the Chilean consumer. J.C. Penney also tried to operate in Chile, and opened one store in 
1995 in Mall Alto Las Condes. Similar to Sears’ experience, J.C. Penney’s retail offer was not 
adequate for the tastes and needs of Chilean consumers. In addition, J.C. Penney confronted 
several problems, such as site limitations (most malls were owned by local competitors), 
inadequate merchandise assortment, and high logistic costs. In both cases, Chilean retailers 
took strong actions to defend their local market positions. 
Falabella 
Falabella is the largest department store retailer in Chile, owned by the Solari family. It 
is the undisputable leader of the department store sector, the main credit card controller, and 
the main shopping mall owner. Consolidated sales for the year 2002 were US$1.182 millions, 
which represents an 8,2% growth compared to 2001. Profits were US$974 millions, which 
represents 30% increase over 2001 (company annual report, 2002).  
Falabella was founded in 1889, by the Italian immigrant Salvatore Falabella, with the 
opening of the first apparel store in downtown Santiago. In the 1960s, Falabella starts its 
growth by incorporating appliances and house supplies, and expanding outside of Santiago to 
Concepcion. Since then, Falabella has diversified its product and service offering by 
                                                          
3 Diario El Mercurio, 04/03/03 
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incorporating services such as credit, air tickets, insurance, wedding gift lists, and remote sales 
through Falabella.com y Fonocompras. Falabella is also participating in other companies such 
as Farmacias Ahumada (20%), Mavesa, SAT, HomeStore, and recently opened the Bank 
Falabella. Credit is a fundamental part of Falabella’s business, with their CMR credit card, 
which has more than 3.000.000 customers.  
In Chile, during 2002, due to the strong competition from Ripley and A. Paris, the firm 
reduced the spending on store openings and decided to increase productivity and efficiency in 
its logistic and purchase processes. In Peru, Falabella opened a new retail format, a grocery 
hypermarket named Tottus, which is located in the north of Lima, with 13 sq.mts. Tottus 
offers a complete line of groceries, home, apparel, CMR, insurance and wedding list. 
Additionally, Falabella inaugurated a new Saga-Falabella store in Arequipa, Peru.  
At the end of the year 2002, Falabella operated 31 stores in Chile, 9 in Peru and 5 in 
Argentina. During this year, Falabella was chosen to be incorporated into the Hall of Fame of 
Chilean Marketing, that awards the best brands in marketing in Chile. 
Almacenes Paris 
Almacenes Paris is also a very large department store retailer in the Chilean market. 
The firm recently restructured itself in terms of four business centres: retail, real estate, 
industrial, and financial services.  
Origins of Almacenes Paris go back to the year 1900, when José María Couso founded 
the furniture store Paris. During the 1950s, the company diversified its product mix, 
incorporating apparel, and changing its name to Almacenes Paris. During 1990s, the firm went 
through a growth process with many store openings all over the country. Between 1998 and 
2000 the company invested US$ 327 millions to duplicate store size. However, in the last two 
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years, the firm went through a rationalization process of costs and improvement in their 
logistics and information systems, which led to an increase in profits.   
At the end of 2002, Almacenes Paris operated 16 stores located in several shopping 
malls and city centres. Additionally, Almacenes Paris participates in the ownership of 7 malls; 
Plaza Oeste, Plaza del Trebol, Plaza La Serena, Plaza Tobalaba, Mall Marina Arauco, and 
Mall Calama (company annual report, 2002). 
Ripley  
Ripley is another large department store retailer in Chile and belongs to the Calderon 
family. The company was initially founded in 1956 as a men clothing store, under the name 
Royal. In 1964, the first Ripley store was inaugurated, with a wider assortment of home 
products.   
In 1993, Ripley opened the largest department store in South America, with 14.000 sq. 
mt. in size, in mall Parque Arauco, with the objective of focusing on higher income 
consumers. In 1997, the company created CAR S.A., to administrate credit business and 
strengthen consumer relationships. Ripley also opened a school for training their employees. 
During 1998, Ripley starts operating in Lima, Peru, with one store, following the steps of 
Falabella. In 1999, Ripley opened its second store in Peru.   
During the year 2002, Ripley developed its Bank Ripley, which offered credit to their 
customers. At the end of the year, Ripley totalised 24 stores in Chile, and 2 in Peru, with sales 
of approximately US$ 600 millions4 for that year. 
                                                          
4 Diario El Mercurio,  14/02/2003. 
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Home Improvement Retailing in Chile 
Sales of home improvement and construction materials in Chile for the year 2002 were 
estimated in U.S. $ 4.000 million, and 29% of the market belonged to the four largest home 
improvement retailers: Sodimac, Construmart, Home Store, and Easy. The remaining 71% of 
the market was dispersed among many small neighbourhood stores called ‘ferreterias”.   
Sodimac Home Center and Easy are both mega retailers that offer consumers a wide 
product assortment for home improvement, repairs, and also general home merchandise. Other 
main competitors are Sodimac Constructor and Construmart, both characterized as big 
warehouses that offer mainly construction materials for construction firms and professionals. 
From 1998-2001, Home Depot was the only foreign retailer in this industry, and offered a 
wide assortment of products for home improvement and do-it-yourself activities. During 
October of 2001, Home Depot announced that it had plans to withdraw from Chile, and by the 
end of that year sold its shares to its local partner. Falabella changed the name of Home Depot 
to Home Store and incorporated several changes to the retail offer and store decoration, which 
generated profits for the company in a period of three months.  
Sodimac  
Sodimac is the largest firm of home improvement and building materials in Latin 
America. With more than 50 years operating in Chile, Sodimac has 47 stores in Chile and 5 in 
Colombia. The firm sells more than 50.000 products related to home improvement, do-it-
yourself, and general home merchandise. Sales of Sodimac in 2002 were U.S. $604 million 
(Sodimac annual report, 2002). 
Sodimac was created by a group of construction firms in 1952. During the next thirty 
years Sodimac became the main distributor of materials for construction in Chile. In 1982, 
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Sodimac was bought by Empresas Dersa, and stores were re-oriented towards a new segment 
in the market: products and services for home improvement. The industry at this time was 
composed of many small stores ferreterias, which sold construction materials, tools, and 
accessories for home maintenance to professionals and constructors, but not to home owners 
or general public. 
In 1988, the first Sodimac Home Center was opened, and consisted in a retail store for 
the end-consumers. Home Center store introduced a new format for Chilean consumers 
through a self-service store format, a concept that already had proved successful in other 
countries such as the U.S. and Canada. This store focused on the family and included general 
products for home equipment along with products for home improvement and decoration.  
In 1992, Sodimac decided to develop a new store format in order to reach specifically 
the segment of independent constructors or professionals, and medium-small firms related to 
the construction field. During this year, Sodimac inaugurated a new format called Sodimac-
Constructor, which offered 10.000 products, mostly from local suppliers. Constructor stores 
provide special facilities for professionals and constructors that need a quick service. A drive-
through layout allows customers to drive around the aisles and load up merchandise directly in 
the customer’s truck.  Despite the depressed construction market in Chile, constructor stores 
showed a 16% increase in sales during 2000, reaching sales of U.S. $ 128 million.  
Sodimac was a very tough competitor for Home Depot in the Chilean market. When 
Home Depot announced its intention to start operations in Chile, Sodimac developed and 
implemented an aggressive plan to strengthen its position in the market (Capital, Jan, 2001). 
For this purpose, Sodimac hired new executives, many of them with vast experience in 
retailing, implemented a new logistic distribution system, and trained all of its employees for 
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improving service quality. In addition, Sodimac continued with store expansion, and several 
Home Center stores were opened close by to every Home Depot store. Finally, the firm 
developed a corporate credit card for consumers, which provided credit, special discounts, and 
special payment conditions (Capital, Jan, 2001).   
Easy 
Easy is another relevant retailer in the industry of home improvement. The company 
belongs to the Chilean firm Cencosud, and consists in a specialized chain of home 
improvement retailing, do-it-yourself, and gardening products. Easy also offers clinics for 
consumers that are interested in developing their own home improvement projects. Easy stores 
have on average 12.000 sq.mts., with more than 60.000 products.  
Since 1998, Easy went through an ambitious plan to expand the amount of stores in 
three years from three to fifteen. This was achieved by opening five new stores and acquiring 
the retail chain Proterra, which had presence mainly in the south of Chile. In addition, Easy 
implemented a corporate credit card for consumers, and has incorporated a wider product 
assortment in the stores, very much imitating the practices of the market leader Sodimac. At 
the end of 2002, Easy operated 15 stores located in  Santiago, Vina del Mar, Rancagua, 
Temuco, Curico, Talca, Osorno, Los Angeles, Chillan y Linares (company annual report, 
2002) 
HomeStore 
HomeStore belongs to the company Falabella, and  started its operation at the end of 
2001, by acquiring 66.7% of Home Depot’s stakes in Chile. When Falabella acquired Home 
Depot’s stores, it changed the names of the retail chain to HomeStore S.A., and kept Home 
Depot’s best practices. Additionally, Falabella incorporated new product lines, specially 
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merchandise for women such as house ware, kitchenware and appliances, and also 
incorporated services that were already provided by competitors such as Easy and Home 
Center.   
During 2002, HomeStore was able to improve enormously the financial situation of the 
firm. Until 2001, Home Depot had shown continuous losses during the three years operation in 
Chile. Sandro Solari, General Manager of HomeStore, and member of the Solari family, 
announced in march of 2002 that by just cutting excessive spending and controlling for costs, 
the firm had been able to change losses for profits in three months (El Mercurio, April, 2002). 
The company inaugurated two new stores in Santiago, with a special emphasis on merchandise 
for women. Additionally, during 2002, Home Store was chosen among the 25 best laces to 
work in Chile, organized by the Great Places to Work Institute, and Capital magazine. It was 
number one among the national chosen firms. At the end of 2002, HomeStore owns 7 stores of 
approximately 10.000 sq. mts. in size, and over 40.000 products.  
Discussion and Conclusions 
The analysis of the three relevant retail sectors suggest that the overall Chilean 
retailing industry has consistently reacted towards threats from foreign firms, resulting in a 
local industry with increased level of consolidation, concentration, improved retail offer for 
consumers, and incorporation of best retail practices from foreign retialers.  
Competitiveness:  
In general, most Chilean retail sectors are very competitive. Financial information of 
the firms examined in this study show that although there has been a slight increase in sales, 
there has been a decrease in margins since 1997 due to aggressive competition (see Figure 1). 
The recent recession and threats from foreign retailers have led these firms to invest in 
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technology, logistics, training, and lower their costs in order to improve their competitive 
position in the marketplace. All this has led to aggressive advertising campaigns and price 
wars that enlarge the entry barriers for new local and foreign players, and hinder small firm’s 
survival.  
Strong competitiveness among retail firms has motivated retailers to expand regionally 
into new markets. In all three sectors, the market leader has operations abroad. For example, 
Falabella operates in Argentina with department stores, and in Peru, with department stores 
and a hypermarket Tottus. Ripley operates in Peru, with the same format than in Chile, and 
Cencosud has Jumbo and Easy stores in Argentina. Sodimac operates in Colombia and is 
studying the possibility of expanding to Peru.  
Concentration: 
All retail sectors examined (grocery, department, and home improvement), the three 
major players represent a large portion of market share. Grocery retailing is very concentrated, 
and after the acquisition of Santa Isabel-Ahold by Cencosud, the two main retailers (D&S and 
Cencosud) have more than 45% of the market. Department store retailing is also becoming 
concentrated, with the three main retailers, Falabella, Almacenes Paris, and Ripley, accounting 
for 40% of the market. Finally, the least concentrated is home improvement, with only 29% of 
market share among the four top firms, Sodimac, Easy, Construmart, and Home Store. This 
lower rate of concentration is explained by the fact that this is a younger industry   
Furthermore, most of the retail firms in these industries belong to family holdings that 
operate different business. For example, the Ibanez family, owner of D&S, also owns a private 
university,  a wine company and a hotel in the south of Chile. Cencosud operates grocery 
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retailer Jumbo, home improvement retailer Easy, and several shopping centres in Chile and 
Argentina (see Table 2).  
Improved Retail Offer for Consumers 
A general tendency seen in Chilean retailing industry during the last decade is the 
incorporation of new product and services for consumers. For example, all the retail 
companies analysed had developed corporate credit cards for their customers. Merchandise 
assortment had increased as well as complementary services. For example, hypermarket 
formats included in their assortment offered appliances, electronics, clothes, books, stationary 
products, gardening and outdoor products. Supermarkets provided customers with laundry 
services, gardening, and banking services. Department stores carried book sections, hair 
dressers, and tourist agencies in their stores. Home improvement retailers stocked appliances, 
gifts and garden products, and offered transportation and installation services for their 
products. 
Most of these retailers offered seasonal sales, coffee shops for family fun shopping, 
wide and comfortable parking, car wash, internet shopping availability, week-end shows and 
music, among others.   
Incorporation of Best Practices from Foreign Retailers 
 Sears and J.C. Penney’s experience and practices in Chile was useful for the local 
department stores retailers. Local firms learned much from foreign retailers that operated in 
Chile, especially regarding management practices and technology. This is extensive to the 
others sector in retail, such as grocery and home improvement.  
The threat of multinational companies coming to such a small market like Chile led 
local retailers to an examination of these companies’ strategies around the world. Carrefour’s 
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and Wal-Mart’s big hypermarkets formats and low prices have been the motto for D&S 
growing strategy along the country. Home Depot’s do-it-yourself concept was copied and 
successfully implemented with a local touch by Homecenter Sodimac in Chile, long before the 
international company decided to come into the local market.  
 Furthermore, the interaction with international retailers operating in Chile gave local 
firms the opportunity to learn new concepts related to the industry, such as logistics, consumer 
service, technology, and merchandising, among others. This explains how local retailers from 
all sectors have taken advantage of their knowledge of the local consumer by implementing 
strategies and using the tools developed by international retailers. 
 Additionally, the international experiences of some local retailers along South America 
had complemented the domestic interaction with international retailers just to produce one 
important idea: business models are not exportable to other countries without a prior 
understanding of the local consumer (culture, values, costumes) and local competitive 
environment. This idea has been the key to success for some local retailers such as Cencosud, 
Falabella and Ripley but, at the same time, the ignorance of it, meant a complete failure for the 
top grocery retailer D&S in its attempt to establish operations in Argentina. 
References 
Albert, R. D. (1996), “A Framework and Model for Understanding Latin American and 
Latino/Hispanic Cultural Patterns”, in D. Landis & R. Bhagat (Eds.), Handbook of 
Intercultural Training, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2nd ed., pp. 327-348.  
 
Alexander, N. (1995), “U.K. Retail Expansion in North America and Europe: A Strategic 
 Dilemma”, Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services, Vol. 2(2), 75-82. 
 
Alexander, N. (1997), “International Retailing”, Blackwell Publishers Ltd., U.K. 
 
Arnold, S. J.; and J. Fernie (2000), “Wal-Mart in Europe: prospects for the U.K.”, 
International Marketing Review,  Vol. 17 (4/5), 416-432. 
 
 22
Bianchi, C. and S.J. Arnold (2003), “An Institutional Perspective on Retail Internationalization 
Success: Home Depot in Chile”, paper presented at the Retailing and Services Science 
Conference of the European Institute of Retailing and Service Studies (EIRASS), 
Portland, Oregon, August 2003. 
 
Da Rocha, A. and Dib, L.A. (2002) ‘The entry of Wal-Mart in Brazil and the competitive 
responses of multinational and domestic firms’. International Journal of Retail and 
Distribution Management 30, 61-73. 
 
Davies, B. J. (1995), “The Regulation of Retail Internationalisation: examples from the 
Pacific-Asia Region”, in Mc.Goldrick, P.G., and G. Davies (eds), International 
Retailing: Trends and Strategies, Pitman Publishing, London. 
 
Dupuis, M. and N. Prime (1996), “Business Distance and Global Retailing: A Model for 
Analysis of Key Success/Failure Factors”, International Journal of Retail & 
Distribution Management, Vol. 24(11), 30-38. 
 
Godoy, H. (1985), “El Carácter Chileno”, Editorial Universitaria, Santiago, Chile. 
 
Goldman, A. (2000) ‘Supermarkets in China: the case of Shanghai’. International Review of 
Retail, Distribution and Consumer Research, 10, 1-21. 
 
Goldman, A. (2001), “The Transfer of Retail Formats into developing Economies: The 
Example of China”, Journal of Retailing, 221-242. 
 
Hofstede, G. (1980) “Culture’s Consequences: International Differences in Work Related 
Values”, Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. 
 
Huneeus, P. (1983), “La Cultura Huachaca”, Instituto de Sociología, Universidad Católica de 
Chile, Editora Nueva Generación, Santiago, Chile. 
 
Laulajainen, R. (1991), “Two Retailers go Global: The Geographical Dimension”, 
International Review of Retail, Distribution, and Consumer Research, Vol. 1(5), 607-
626. 
 
O’Grady, S. and H. Lane (1997), “Culture: an Unnoticed Barrier to Canadian Retail 
Performance in the USA”, Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services, Vol. 4(3), 
159-170. 
 
Robinson, T.M. and C.M. Clarke-Hill (1990), “Directional Growth by European Retailers,” 
International Journal of Retail & Distribution Management, Vol. 18 (5), 314. 
 
Sparks, L. (1995), “Reciprocal Retail Internationalisation: The Southland Corporation Ito-
Yokado and 7-Eleven Convenience Stores”, in Akehurst G. and Alexander, N. (Eds.), 
The Internationalisation of Retailing, Frank Cass & Co., London, 57-96. 
 
 23
Sternquist, B. (1997), “International Expansion of U.S. Retailers,” International Journal of 
Retail & Distribution Management, 25 (8), 262-268. 
 
Tordjman, A. (1988), “The French Hypermarket: Could it be Developed in the United 
States?”, Retail and Distribution Management, July-August, 14-16. 
 
Treadgold, A. (1991), “Dixons and Laura Ashley: Different Routes to International Growth”, 
International Journal of Retail and Distribution Management, Vol. 19(4), 13-19. 
 
Wrigley, N. (1997), “British Food Capital in the USA-Part 2: Giant Prospects”, International 
Journal of Retail & Distribution Management, Vol. 25(2), 48-58. 
 
Wrigley, N. (2003), “The Stresses of Retail Internationalization: Lessons from Royal Ahold’s 
Experience in Latin America”, International Review of Retail, Distribution and 
Consumer Research, Vol. 13. 
 24
APPENDIX 
 
Table 1 – Grocery Retailing Industry in Argentina 2002 * 
 
ARGENTINA 
Chain    Market    
    Share   
 
Carrefour  31,3 %  (France) 
Disco-Ahold    18,2 %  (Netherland)    
Coto     15,9 %     (Argentina) 
Casino       5,8 %  (France)   
Jumbo     4,9 %  (Chile)  
Wal-Mart      4,4 %  (USA) 
 
* sources: CCR/IRI, Nielsen 2002 
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Table 2 – Retailing Industry in Chile 2002* 
 
Chain     Market  Sales 2002 Nº Stores Ownership 
     Share % (MMUS$)  
 
Grocey Retailing 
D& S    30.0   1.293      62 (Ibanez Family 
Santa Isabel       9.7        394      76 (Disco-Ahold) 
Jumbo        8.5     426       7 (Paulmann Family) 
 
Department Store  
Retailing 
Falabella   21.5  1.182       31  (Solari Family) 
Ripley      10.0        600     24 (Calderon Family) 
Almacenes Paris      9.5     519         16  (Galmez Family) 
 
Pharmaceutical  
Retailing 
FASA    33    325   234 (Codner Family) 
SalcoBrand   33    320   230 (NA) 
Cruz Verde   28    270   290 (Harding Family) 
 
Home Improvement  
Retailing 
 Sodimac  16.3            565        49     (Del Rio Family) 
 HomeStore   3,3             121        7     (Solari Fmily) 
 Easy   2,3            86     15     (Paulmann Family) 
 
 
 
 
* Source: Company Annual Reports, 2002; AC Nielsen Report 2002. 
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• FIGURE 1: EVOLUTION OF RETAILING INDUSTRY MARGINS* 
 
  
* Source: Center for Retailing and Services Studies  
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